"Mathematical Methods, Models and Architectures for Computer Networks Security" (MMM-ACNS) 2007, CCIS 1, pp. 34-41, 2007.
Secure protocols rely on a number of assumptions about the
environment which, once made, free the designer from thinking about
the complexity of what surrounds the execution context.
Henceforth, the designer forgets about the environment and moves on
proving her algorithm correct, given the assumptions. When assumptions
do not represent with sufficient accuracy the environment they are supposed
to depict, they may become the door to successful attacks on an
otherwise mathematically correct algorithm. Moreover, this can happen
as unwitting to systems as a Trojan Horse’s action.
We wish to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of those problems
and evaluate some recent research results that demonstrate a few of those
limitations in actual secure protocols.
author = "Paulo Verissimo",
title = "Assumptions: The Trojan Horses of Secure Protocols ",
booktitle = "Mathematical Methods, Models and
Architectures for Computer Networks Security (MMM-ACNS) 2007, CCIS 1",
pages = "34--41",
year = "2007",
month = sep
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