*Paulo VerĂssimo*

"Mathematical Methods, Models and Architectures for Computer Networks Security" (MMM-ACNS) 2007, CCIS 1, pp. 34-41, 2007.

Secure protocols rely on a number of assumptions about the

environment which, once made, free the designer from thinking about

the complexity of what surrounds the execution context.

Henceforth, the designer forgets about the environment and moves on

proving her algorithm correct, given the assumptions. When assumptions

do not represent with sufficient accuracy the environment they are supposed

to depict, they may become the door to successful attacks on an

otherwise mathematically correct algorithm. Moreover, this can happen

as unwitting to systems as a Trojan Horse’s action.

We wish to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of those problems

and evaluate some recent research results that demonstrate a few of those

limitations in actual secure protocols.

@InProceedings{ver07assumptions,

author = "Paulo Verissimo",

title = "Assumptions: The Trojan Horses of Secure
Protocols ",

booktitle = "Mathematical
Methods, Models and

Architectures for Computer Networks Security (MMM-ACNS) 2007, CCIS 1",

pages = "34--41",

year = "2007",

month = sep

}

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