

ENFORCING REAL-TIME BEHAVIOUR ON LAN-BASED PROTOCOLS

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ABSTRACT: Local area networks form the basis of a number of distributed real-time systems. While current standard technology does not solve all problems related with achieving real-time behaviour — in essence, bounded and known message delivery delays — designers should be able to build reliable LAN-based real-time systems now, using existing technology, VLSI, and namely, non-replicated architectures. Methods and techniques that make this possible are worthwhile being studied. This paper describes the concepts and design options used in the Delta-4 project to overcome the problems posed by reliable real-time operation over standard LANs, whose only redundancy exists at the physical medium level.

KEYWORDS: Local Area Networks, Real-time Computing Systems, Communications Reliability, Communications Protocols, Computer Communications.

1 Introduction

Local area networks form the basis of a number of distributed real-time systems. It is mandatory that they display real-time behaviour — in essence, bounded and known message delivery delays — and an interesting fact is that structure alone does not determine real-time behaviour of a LAN. As an example we find a discussion by Janetzky & Watson [5] on the need to account for individual offered load patterns, to avoid violation of the bounded access delay offered in principle by ISO 8802/4 token-bus networks.

These facts call for a systemic approach to substantiate any claims of real-time behaviour of LAN-based systems. Namely, to dress an elementary LAN with a model and a service, composing a subsystem on which the correctness of other system services lies — for the matter of this paper, time-domain correctness or *timeliness*. This approach was followed for example in the Mars system [6], which assumes a duplicated Ethernet LAN, and in the AAS system, which uses n-plicated token-rings [1]. Both architectures are based on a communication service with a well-defined subsystem interface offering certain properties. The fact that the network is replicated offers resilience against failure of a single medium.

Despite what was said in the opening paragraphs, designers should be able to build LAN-based real-time systems *now*, using existing technology, VLSI, etc.

Methods and techniques that make this possible are worthwhile being studied. One question to be asked is whether one can reliably obtain real-time behaviour out of single, non-replicated LANs. The Delta-4¹ system architecture uses standardised LANs, whose only redundancy may exist at the physical — electrical signalling in the medium — level [8]. The reader should observe that this leads to a simpler system and to a cost-effective network infra-structure. The quality of service achieved satisfies a wide spectrum of applications, with exception of those critical ones which require glitch-free continuity of service provision, or which have very narrow timeliness and synchronism specifications. For these exceptions, specialised space-redundant architectures are recommended.

This paper describes concepts, design options and lessons learned in Delta-4, to overcome the problems posed in achieving reliable real-time operation of standard LANs. In short, a number of conditions to achieve that aim are enumerated. Then, we establish a set of attributes for an abstract low-level frame delivery service and show that such a service fulfils the reliable real-time operation requirement. Finally, we show that “dressing” a given LAN with the necessary mechanisms and protocols to implement the service is easily achievable. One of these mechanisms is an innovative technique to tolerate partitions in real-time

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networks, based on a concept called *inaccessibility*.

2 Reliable Real-Time communications requirements

It is assumed that the faulty behaviour LANs display consists of timing failures (delays) due to overload; omission failures (lost frames), due to transmission errors; network partitions (eg. due to medium failure).

The requirement for reliable real-time operation of a communications subsystem is:

RT - *A reliable real-time network displays bounded and known message delivery latency, in the presence of disturbing factors such as overload or faults.*

In trying to obtain this behaviour out of a LAN, the failure modes just enumerated must be taken into account². Their effects must in some way be tolerated or limited. The conditions presented below are sufficient to achieve requirement **RT**:

1. **enforce bounded delay from request to transmission of a frame³, given the worst case load conditions assumed (avoid timing failures);**
2. **ensure a message⁴ is delivered despite the occurrence of omission failures (tolerate omission failures);**
3. **control partitions.**

Condition 1 makes sure that any frame is sent within a known time bound, even if it does not arrive. Condition 2 ensures that a message is delivered, even if that implies, for example, the transmission of several frames to tolerate omissions. Condition 3 is mandatory for real-time systems. Since real-time systems are supposed to make progress within more or less rigid time constraints, they do not tolerate partitions in general. It is proposed to admit a class of *controlled* partitions, which can be tolerated with the necessary measures.

3 The Abstract Network Model

A model for a network displaying reliable real-time operation has been advanced in [11] and laid down in [10]. It was called the *abstract network*.

The idea is to consider a set of networks of a given type (LANs in the case) and be able to define a set of common properties abstracting from their physical particularities. The abstract network thus forms a low-level service, useful to build complex protocols on top of, and rendering them LAN-independent. In this case, it models the standardised ISO LANs⁵ (8802/x, FDDI). The abstract network attributes concerning this discussion can be enumerated as follows:

²As well as architectural factors such as the fact that the LAN is not replicated, making transmission errors unavoidable.

³LAN level information packet.

⁴User level information packet.

⁵Including the 8802/3 CSMA/CD, if the deterministic variant [7], although not standard, is considered.

An1 - Every frame queued for transmission is transmitted by the network within a bounded delay $T_{td} + T_{ina}$.

An2 - A network, in a known interval T_{rd} , may do at most k consecutive omission errors, either caused by a transmitter or a receiver or the medium⁶.

An3 - A network, in a known interval T_{rd} , may be inaccessible at most i times.

T_{td} is the worst-case delay from request to end of transmission, in a normally operating network. T_{ina} is the maximum duration of a network inaccessibility period. Let us accept at this point that *inaccessibility* is a period when the network does not provide service, although remaining operational (take the example of the period from token-loss to recovery in a token LAN). It will be defined shortly.

Enforcing a bounded transmission time

Enforcing a bounded and known transmission time bound, T_{td} (An1), has not only to do with controlling the overall load offered by peer traffic, but also with distinguishing among classes of urgency. Higher urgency traffic may thus be guaranteed enough of the channel bandwidth to fulfil its latency requirements, in detriment of lower urgency ones. However, the latter may use the channel during idle periods, improving bandwidth efficiency of the communication system. This concerns:

- the own mechanisms of LANs — eg. priorities, to ensure that load offered to the network by nodes is controlled in a way to achieve that aim;
- user-level load control — in terms of bounded and known average arrival rate and minimum inter-arrival time of transmission requests at each node.

We will not spend too much time with these issues, since they have been studied by a number of authors [5, 3, 4].

Handling omission failures

The bounded omission degree⁷ assumption introduced in **An2** is very helpful as the foundation of basic error processing protocols with deterministic termination — crucial for real-time operation. Other properties of higher-level reliable broadcast/multicast protocols are easily implemented above the omission-free abstract network.

The assumption is realistic and it is based on the observation that omission errors are rare in LANs but may occur in bursts. Additionally, it is reasonable, for the limited interval of a protocol execution, to make the single fault assumption. In consequence, these omission bursts derive from the failure of a single component [10]. A number of ways of handling

⁶In receiver or medium failures, errors as perceived by the recipient are consecutive; in the case of consecutive transmitter failures, these may be interleaved with good transmissions from other points, from the recipient's viewpoint.

⁷We call *omission degree* (Od) to the number of consecutive omissions produced by a component.

(a) transmission-with-reply

```
50 tries := 0; Resp := empty
51 do tries < nrTries ∧ Resp ≠ full →
52     Resp := empty;
53     Tx(data, idtries);
54 waitRepliesPutIn(TwaitReply, Resp);
55 tries := tries + 1    od
```

(b) diffusion

```
50 tries := 0;
51 do tries < nrTries →
52
53     Tx(data, idtries);
54
55 tries := tries + 1    od
```

Figure 1: k -omission tolerant protocol: (a) acknowledgment based; (b) diffusion based.

omission failures are possible. Two alternative ways, based respectively on detection/recovery and masking of omission errors, are presented in figure 1. If k is the maximum omission degree as per An2, then $NrTries = k + 1$.

The detection/recovery algorithm is implemented through transmission-with-reply rounds⁸. Since error rate is expected to be low, this is optimal for the average case. After transmission, replies from a number of recipients are awaited for; replies are put in a bag *Resp*, which becomes full when it has all expected replies. In absence of errors there is only one try. The *waitRepliesPutIn* function waits at most during *TwaitReply*, after which it returns with the replies it got. Note that the several tries to send message with reference *id* are identified by an index *tries* (l.53). Reference *id* allows detection of duplicates. The version in (a) of the figure was presented in [10]. It seeks a completely correct series, i.e. one where all recipients receive a given try and all replies are got, in order to enforce total order among competing LAN transmissions⁹. A minor variation consisting of deleting line 52, yields an unordered version.

The masking algorithm — (b) in the figure — is diffusion-based and in principle obtains the lowest worst-case delivery delay, given that it systematically repeats a transmission $k + 1$ times, without waiting for any replies or error-detecting timeouts. However, note that if $T_{waitReply} \approx T_{td}$, both expressions for worst-case delivery delay will yield similar values. Given An2, after its execution at least one instance of message *id* arrives at every recipient. However it introduces a fixed overhead in processing, increases network load, and total order is not ensured.

The transmission-with-reply method allows detection of failure, i.e. absence of reply after $k + 1$ tries. This also works in the case of coverage failure of the bounded omission degree assumption (the

⁸This is different from the LLC type 3 service, namely because it is multipoint and because replies can convey semantically useful information.

⁹Besides merely conferring transmission reliability, the ordering property of this low level protocol may be used to build very efficient atomic protocols [11].

abstract network detects the fact; it will be up to the higher-level protocol to handle it). In this sense, transmission-with-reply is safer than diffusion, in case coverage of An2 is not considered high enough. This is very important in real-life networks, where large noise bursts can arise.

The transmission-with-reply method, being bidirectional, requires a tighter coupling than diffusion, between sender and recipients. Overall scalability is similar, if a group orientation (multicast) is considered. In fact, average group dimension remains rather stable with system size increase. With regard to scalability of group dimension, diffusion is obviously better. An additional feature of transmission-with-reply is that the replies can also convey information from the recipients in a performance-efficient manner. This information may be useful for higher-level protocols built above the abstract network; this feature was used in [10]. A comparison between both methods is summarized in table 1.

Anyway, if bounded transmission delay T_{td} is ensured, either of these mechanisms implementing An2 satisfy the second condition to attain real-time behaviour: message delivery despite omission failures.

The main feature of the bounded omission degree technique, whichever transmission method used, is that it has deterministic termination, i.e. it executes within a bounded and known time, in absence of partitions.

Controlling Partitions: Inaccessibility

The third condition is to control partitions. It is the trickiest problem to solve and it will be discussed at some length in the sequel of the paper.

Let a network be partitioned when there are subsets of the nodes which cannot communicate with each other¹⁰. Remember that the LAN is not replicated, so there are a number of causes for partition in LANs: bus medium failure (cable or tap defect), ring disruption, transmitter or receiver defects; token loss; etc.

A first observation is that, although partitions are undesirable in real-time, the LAN will at least have glitches in operation, since it is not replicated. Some standard LANs have embedded means of recovering from a number of the situations described above (eg. token regeneration for token-based LANs). The aim is to control all of them.

The solution is based on a very simple idea: if one knows for how long a network is partitioned, then synchronous, real-time operation of the system is possible, provided that those glitch periods are acceptably short. Let us call them periods of *inaccessibility*, to differentiate from classical partitions.

Inaccessibility has been introduced in [11]. Its formal definition in [10] is recalled here:

Certain kinds of components may temporarily refrain from providing service, without that having to be necessarily considered a failure. That state, that we call inaccessibility, is definable, if:

¹⁰The subsets may have a single element. When the network is completely down, all partitions have a single element, since each node can communicate with no one.

Features	Tx-with-reply	diffusion
execution time	lowest w/ no faults	lowest w/ w-case faults
w-case deliv. delay	$k.T_{waitReply} + T_{td}$	$(k+1).T_{td}$
no-fault deliv. delay	equal	equal
directionality	bi-	uni-
scalability (overall) (of groups)	equal	equal highest
proc. overhead		highest
network load		highest
total order	possible	not possible
failure detection	yes	no
upper-layer info in reply frame	possible	not applicable
resilience to lack of coverage	high (detects violation)	none

Table 1: Comparison between transmission-with-reply and diffusion methods.

- (i) it can be made known to the users of the component;
- (ii) inaccessibility limits (duration, rate) are part of the component specification;
- (iii) violation of those limits implies permanent failure of the component.

We now explain our approach to control partitions, based on transforming them in inaccessibility periods. All that is necessary is for the abstract network implementation to complement LAN functionality in order to:

- recover from all conditions leading to partition, i.e. reestablish connectivity among affected nodes;
- ensure that the inaccessibility periods have a bound and that it is suitably low for the service requirements;
- accommodate inaccessibility in protocol execution and timeliness calculations.

This is not hard to implement, as shown in the next section. Uncontrolled partitions are of course still possible, because systems do fail, but that event means the total and permanent failure of the real-time communications subsystem.

An3 is attained through this methodology, and a network exhibiting An3 satisfies the third condition to achieve real-time behaviour enumerated in section 2.

4 Implementing inaccessibility control

Given the concept and shown it is the foundation for reliable real-time operation of single LANs subject to partitions, design criteria and protocols to set-up an abstract network fulfilling **An3** are presented next.

First, one must recover from all conditions leading to partition. For example, recovering from physical — mechanical or electrical — partition by means of

Rate Mbps	t_{dl} μs	t_{SD} μs	t_{Sl} μs	Scenario	t_{ina} (ms)	
5	36	11	27	Token Loss	5.98	
				No Successor	0.32	
				Join	Contention	3.70
				No Conten.	0.10	
10	18	22	49	Token Loss	9.98	
				No Successor	0.37	
				Join	Contention	5.49
				No Conten.	0.14	

Table 2: Inaccessibility Times For Token Bus. t_{dl} : delimiter (header/trailer) duration; t_{SD} : station delay; t_{Sl} : slot-time; t_{ina} : inaccessibility periods.

medium and physical layer redundancy is assured in standard FDDI, through a dual-reconfiguring ring, capable of surviving one interruption of the ring [2]. In a token-bus network some similar measures should be custom-implemented, for instance dual-media, since it has no standardised redundancy.

In general, one needs to show that all the recovery glitches are time-bounded and determine the upper bound. Those include operating situations, typical to each LAN, such as re-establishment of the logical ring after loss of token and physical reconfiguration subsequent to ring breakage, or switch-over to an operational spare after bus failure, etc. To illustrate this engineering procedure, a study of ISO 8802/4 token-bus inaccessibility is presented in table 2. The scenarios are the causes for inaccessibility foreseen in the standard specification. Absolute worst-case figures are given in a detailed study (cf. [9]) but the LAN can be configured and operated so as to limit them to the figures in the table. Medium failure is not accounted for, because we devised a method for real-time switch-over between busses of a dual-media token-bus which is glitch-free [12].

Finally, inaccessibility must be included in the timeliness model. Let us consider a system only with local clocks (timers), used to implement timeouts. Timeouts detect timing, omission and crash failures in the abstract network protocols. They can also be used by upper-layer protocols to perform surveillance of remote parties, upon waiting for the reply to a request (eg. RPC). Two things are necessary: calculation of real execution times (for real-time processing purposes) and dimensioning of timeouts taking inaccessibility into account.

Calculations for real worst-case protocol execution times will have terms which are a function of T_{ina} , corresponding to worst-case inaccessibility periods that may occur during an execution. According to **An3**, in an interval chosen at random, T_{rd} , there may be i inaccessibility periods. When engineering the protocol, this must be taken into account. When calculating timeliness however, more workable assumptions can be made. Let us simplify by assuming that $i = 1$ and that during a whole protocol execution there can be at most one inaccessibility period. This is realistic for most settings, and implies that T_{ina} be simply added to the worst-case protocol execution time expression computed without taking inaccessibility into account. We will use this assumption in the sequel of the text.

Timeout values depend on execution times. Protocol timers must in general include T_{ina} , or else they timeout too early should inaccessibility occur. In this case, the protocol may fail¹¹.

At this point, note that incorporating T_{ina} in the timers is a sufficient condition for running synchronous (real-time) protocols over the abstract network, using the transmission-with-reply protocol. The diffusion protocol requires additional measures, since it does not use timeouts. Before going any further, note that the timers are now undesirably long, since T_{ina} may be much greater than T_{td} . A solution hiding inaccessibility away would be welcome, with two obvious advantages: giving the programmer the simple and elegant abstraction of a virtual distributed environment which is always connected; yielding shorter timeouts.

4.1 Timer-freezing mechanism

The mechanism proposed to hide inaccessibility is very simple. It concerns all timeouts controlling timeliness of remote interactions, be them transmission-with-reply timeouts or upper-layer timeouts. The value of the timeouts does not include inaccessibility. The mechanism is based on stopping (freezing) all timers when inaccessibility is detected and while it lasts, and restarting them when the network becomes accessible again.

All protocols can then be constructed as if the network were always accessible. Both algorithms of figure 1 will work unchanged. As an example, a protocol over a token-bus can assume that the LAN is always in steady state with the ring formed, and that there are no station joins or leaves, and no token losses. Then, the worst-case frame transmission time in all situations, from the programmer or protocol designer's point of view¹², is merely the maximum queue plus access plus transmission delay, T_{td} , under those operating conditions. This yields an optimal sizing of timers, with regard to detection of other errors, such as omission and node failures.

On the other hand, worst-case timeliness calculations, i.e. determining the real duration of activities, are tuned by adding T_{ina} — which must be determined for each LAN — to the computed protocol execution time expressions.

4.2 Inaccessibility masking mechanism

Freezing the timers is an engineering issue, which implies: inaccessibility to be detected by the communications adapter part; information between the adapter and the timers to flow quickly enough; timers to be stopped/resumed on arrival of in-/accessibility notifications.

¹¹ Consider the example of the protocol of figure 1(a): if the $T_{waitReply}$ timer does not include T_{ina} , it may timeout all the $k + 1$ times during an inaccessibility period, and recipient failure is wrongly detected. The one in figure 1(b) makes the higher-level user believe the message was indeed delivered after some estimated delay; in fact, it may be waiting in some queue long after.

¹²I.e. for the sake of dimensioning timeouts.




Figure 2: Timing of the inaccessibility masking mechanism

While this mechanism can be easily implemented on specially built hardware, the conditions named above are not always met in existing hardware/software platforms. Namely: the timer package may not have the functionality for lightweight start-restart; some LAN controllers do not signal all inaccessibility situations, or do not do it consistently at all nodes.

Thence, an alternative had to be sought, since porting of the abstract network to existing environments was desired. We devised a mechanism which masks inaccessibility at the network interface level. We explain it next.

Assume that the following system requirements are fulfilled: (i) in the interface with the abstract network, all requests are positively confirmed *when the frame is transmitted*. (ii) in a layered architecture, the higher-level request is also confirmed: the low-level confirmation that the request was served propagates up the layers; (iii) timers to control a remote request are only started after the confirmation that it was issued. In consequence, when the network is inaccessible the confirmation does not come. Timer $T_{waitRemote}$ equals the desired waiting time at any level of the system (to receive an RPC result, or a transmission reply). Let us follow the several situations depicted in figure 2:

Situation (1): Since a remote interaction is started by a **send** request, a timer controlling it at whatever level will be pending of the confirmation from the network. Should it be inaccessible, timer start will be postponed until the network becomes accessible again.

Situation (2): After the timer is started, it will count up to $T_{waitRemote}$. In this situation, the network becomes inaccessible after the timer is started and accessible again before it expires. If there is not enough time for the remote frame to arrive, the timer will expire.

Situation (3): Inaccessibility lasts beyond $T_{waitRemote}$, but ends before anything is attempted in order to recover. A timeout is issued here as well.

Situations (2) and (3) are analogous. They are not disturbing: the timer is there to detect these facts. Inaccessibility has just been transformed into an omission. Given An2 and An3, whatever methods used to take care of k omissions in the system, will keep working for $k + i$ (i - number of inaccessibility occurrences, see An3). This means that inaccessibility is in

fact masked out of the system algorithms above the abstract network. The system programmer can, for example, be given a consolidated $K = k + i$ omission bound figure.

Note the very little difference between the effect of inaccessibility in situations 2 or 3, and that of a slightly longer LAN access time. In fact, ‘inaccessibility’ would not be needed for this, it would suffice to make timers a little longer. However, this approach is justified by the bi-modal characteristic of LAN operation, with the more serious inaccessibility situations lasting much longer than T_{id} and thus $T_{waitRemote}$. That is the case of:

Situation (4): Inaccessibility still lasts when recovery is attempted (the second send request).

The protocol failures due to short timers described earlier in a footnote occurred because the protocols might proceed during an inaccessibility period. In order for this mechanism of *short timers* and *transforming inaccessibility into omissions* to work, it is necessary that each inaccessibility period is seen as *one* ‘omission’. The confirmed send request performs this role, preventing the protocol from proceeding until the period ends. Note also why the duration of inaccessibility does not affect system timers: it is either simultaneous with the $T_{waitRemote}$ period, or with the request-to-confirmation period.

We have shown that inaccessibility is masked out of all system activity: its duration is hidden; its occurrence is transformed into an omission. Looking back at the algorithms of figure 1, both will work:

- the diffusion algorithm is throttled by the abstract network interface in case of inaccessibility, if correctly used, i.e. the user protocol should not proceed beyond a point where a reliable delivery is assumed, without receiving the collection of $k + 1$ transmission confirmations corresponding to that delivery;
- the transmission-with-reply algorithm works practically unchanged; the only modification required is to make $nrTries = k + i + 1$ instead of just $k + 1$. An individual transmission in case of inaccessibility works like the example in figure 2, with $T_{waitReply}$ substituted for $T_{waitRemote}$.

On the quantitative side, execution times are not increased by T_{ina} anymore when faults occur (the case with including T_{ina} in the timer values). Besides, when inaccessibility occurs, in lieu of increasing by T_{ina} , they increase *at most* by t_{ina} (the effective duration, which may be much lower than T_{ina}).

The disadvantage with regard to the timer freezing scheme, which ‘stops’ the time in this part of the system, is that timeouts do occur due to inaccessibility, and recoveries have to be initiated.

5 Conclusions

Methodologies for enforcing reliability and real-time behaviour of standard LANs have been discussed. The definition of a LAN-based communication subsystem with a well-defined set of properties provides, in addition to several non-functional attributes,

very simple low-level reliable frame delivery services. These have proved to ease construction of complex protocols such as reliable multicast. The handling of failures which may hinder timeliness, including a class of *controlled* partitions, was shown to be possible in non-replicated networks, in order to yield reliable real-time operation.

Such mechanisms substantiate the correctness of the approach of designing robust real-time distributed systems using standard communication components, followed for example in the Delta-4 architecture.

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